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1. INTRODUCTION
An important new field of international law, known today as
"international economic law," has emerged and taken form.
Although the fundaments of international economic law have
existed for at least half a century, the modern international law
system stands at a critical juncture. It is always remarkable when
new fields of law emerge and take form. Such an event is
especially important when the new field becomes part of the body
of international law, where there is no supranational government
with the power to declare and enforce rules of international law
binding upon sovereign nation-states.
The centerpiece of the international economic law system is
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT" or
"General Agreement").' GATT was originally negotiated in 1947
("GATT 1947") by the allied nations who had won World War
H1.2 Since 1947, most nations of the world, together with several
* Algernon Sydney Biddle Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania
Law School.
' The text of the general agreement, as negotiated in 1947, may be found
in the United Nations Treaty Series at 55 U.N.T.S. 1867 and in United States
Statutes at Large at 61 Stat. A3 [hereinafter GATT 1947].
2 Twenty-three nations participated in drafting the text of the GATT,
which contained an Article XXVI for its acceptance and entry into force. See
id. 61 Stat. A3, at A69, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, at 274. The Article XXVI provisions
were never used. Rather, eight nations entered into a truncated version of the
General Agreement through the Protocol of Provisional Application ("PPA").
See id. 61 Stat. at A8-10, 55 U.N.T.S. at 312. The term "provisional" in the
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customs unions have joined, or are attempting to join, the GATT
system. At the conclusion of the most recent round of GATT
negotiations, the Uruguay Round, 117 nations, commonly known
as the "contracting parties,"4 negotiated the complex new agree-
title of the Protocol signaled that these eight nations initially expected the
General Agreement to enter into force soon after 1947 under Article XXVI.
Those provisions of GATT have never been used, however. See JOHN H.
JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 1 (1990) (lamenting that
"[alfter 40 years of 'provisional application,' one might think the world was
ready for something more than 'provisional'").
The PPA, by its terms, was open for other nations to sign. Since 1948,
more than 100 nations have joined the GATT system in that manner. See
ROBERT E. HUDEC, TE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE
DIPLOMACY 226 (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter HUDEC DIPLOMACY] (noting the
vast increase in GATT membership).
The PPA did not purport to put the entire draft of the General Agreement
into effect. It only provided that Part II (Articles 11 through XXI would
apply "to the fullest extent not inconsistent with existing legislation." GATT
1947, supra note 1, 61 Stat. at A2051, 55 U.N.T.S. at 308. Legal consequences
of that "savings clause" have been considerable. See JACKSON, supra at 14
(stating that governments have often asserted the clause to justify "certain
national actions regarding international trade").
I Two blocs of nations historically remained outside the GATT system.
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union created an international trade body,
COMECON, for trade relations among nations within the Eastern bloc of
Soviet satellite nations. With notable exceptions including Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Poland, and Romania, COMECON nations were not members of the
GATT system. During the Cold War period East-West trade was conducted
outside the GATT regime. The Republic of China, a founder of GATT, left
the GATT system. See Jayetta Z. Hecker, State Trading Enterprises -
Compliance with the General Areement on Tariffs and Trade, GAO REP., Aug.
30, 1995, at 1, 27. China and Russia are now in the process of seeking to
become members of GATT. See id. at 27-28; see also Knock, Knock, ECONO-
MIST, Jan. 13, 1996, at 72 (describing Russia and China's desire to join the
WTO/GATT system).
Many Islamic countries of the Middle East, including Iran, Iraq, Libya,
Saudi Arabia, and Syria, comprise the second large group still outside the
GATT system. Thus, international trade in oil from these important OPEC
nations is not governed by GATT law. Egypt, Kuwait, and Morocco,
however, are GATT nations. See JACKSON, supra note 2 app. at 104 (listing theGATT contracting parties). Additionally, several other Middle Eastern nations
apply GATT on a defacto basis even though they have not formally joined the
system. See Alastair Mirst, Developing IPR in the Gulf Current Coverage
Problems, Post-Uruguay Round Trends, 17 MID. EAST EXEC. REP., May, 1994,
at 9.
' See GATT Secretariat, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, reprinted in 33 I.L.M.
1125, 1131 [hereinafter GATT 1994] (listing 117 contracting parties).
Contracting parties are "those governments which [apply] the provisions
of [the GATT] under Article XXVI, or pursuant to the [PPA]." GATT 1947,
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ment known as the "Uruguay Round Agreements" or "GATT
1994."' The culmination of the Uruguay Round and the creation
of the World Trade Organization ("WTO") in GATT 1994 after
seven years of extraordinary effort, is a defining moment in the
evolution of international economic law.
6
GATT 1994 is a remarkable achievement in many respects.
While GATT 1947 deals only with trade in goods, GATT 1994
covers, among other matters: trade in services and some aspects of
foreign direct investment and intellectual property rights. With
respect to trade in goods, GATT 1994 resolves a number of
recurrent problems that caused considerable difficulty under
GATT 1947.' Moreover, GATT 1994 also includes major
supra note 1, art. XXXII, para. 1, 61 Stat. at A75, 55 U.N.T.S. at 282. Article
XXV uses "CONTRACTING PARTIES," in all capital letters, to mean "the
contracting parties acting jointly." Id. art. XXV, para. 1, 61 Stat. at A68, 55
U.N.T.S. at 272. This Article preserves the distinction and will utilize all
capital letters to indicate those instances where the contracting parties act
jointly.
In the GATT 1994 agreement, the 12 European Community ("EC")
nations are listed individually. and as a collective. See GATT 1994, supra, 33
I.L.M. at 1131. Most contracting parties are nations, but the GATT system is
open to entities not recognized by the international community as sovereign
nations. A "government acting on behalf of a separate customs territory
possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations
and of the other matters provided for in this Agreement may accede to [the
GATT system]." GATT 1947, supra note 1, art. XXXIII, 61 Stat. at A75, 55
U.N.T.S. at 284. For example, Hong Kong and Macau are listed as contracting
parties. See GATT 1994, supra, 33 I.L.M. at 1131. An additional group of
nations are recognized by the CONTRACTING PARTIES as applying GATT
on a de facto basis. See discussion supra note 3. Many of these are in the
process of becoming a contracting party. See discussion supra note 3.
5 See GATT 1994, supra note 4.
6 See generally JEFFREY J. SCHOTT & JOHANNA W. BUURMAN, THE
URUGUAY ROUND: AN ASSESSMENT (1994) (detailing the efforts that the
parties undertook to complete the Uruguay round).
7 See GATT 1994, supra note 4, annexes 1A-1C, 33 I.L.M. at 1154, 1167,
and 1197.
" These problems include dumping, subsidies, rules of origin, customs
valuation, safeguards, and technical barriers to trade. See Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994; Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures; Agreement on
Rules of Origin; Agreement on Implementation of Article VIE of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994; Agreement on Safeguards; Agreement
on Technical Barrier to Trade, all reprinted in GATT SECRETARIAT, THE
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIA-
TIONS, THE LEGAL TEXTS, annex 1A (1994) (reprinting GATT 1947 and the
General Agreement as it emerged from the Uruguay Round) [hereinafter LEGAL
1996]
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agreements on agriculture and textiles - two trade sectors that
have been the source of severe conflicts among producing
nations.'
One of the most significant parts of GATT 1994 is the
development of a mechanism for authoritative interpretation and
enforcement of GATT substantive law. Resolution of disputes
within the GATT system has become the preeminent example of
litigation in international law. The Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ("1994 Under-
standing"), a key document contained in the Uruguay Round
agreements," builds upon the GATT dispute settlement mecha-
nism which had evolved in a slow and incremental manner under
GATT 1947.11
On January 17, 1996, the machinery of the 1994 Understand-
ing produced its first panel ruling in the "gasoline import stan-
dards" case.12  In that case, Brazil and Venezuela successfully
challenged U.S. environmental regulations that set higher Clean
Air Act standards for imported gasoline than for similar domesti-
cally produced fuels. 3 The United States appealed the decision
particularly with regard to the panel's view of the legitimacy
TEXTS].
" See Agreement on Agriculture; Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, both
reprinted in LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 8, annex 1A.
10 The process for resolving trade disputes under the WTO is set forth in
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, GATT 1994, supra note 4, Annex 2, 33 I.L.M. at 1226 [hereinafter
1994 Understanding].
" See JACKSON, supra note 2, at 16-17 (noting that "the GATT limped
along for forty years").
12 See Bhushan Bahree, WTO Panel Rules Against U.S. in Dispute Over
Gasoline Norms, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 1996, at All; Paul Blustein, VTO
Ruling Draws Fierce Criticism, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 1996, at F3; David E.
Sanger, World Trade Group Orders U.S. to Alter Clean Air Act, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 18, 1996, at Dl, D6.
13 Acting under the Clean Air Act, the Environmental Protection Ageny
promulgated a rule that had the effect of setting more stringent standards for
imported gasoline than for domestically produced fuel. See Sanger, supra note
12, at D6. U.S. producers were permitted to meet standards derived from the
quality of their own 1990 gasoline; foreign producers were required to meet a
statutory standard, without regard to the quality of their 1990 gasoline. See id.
Venezuela and Brazil contended that the effect was to impose more stringent
standards on gasoline refiners in those nations. See id. This unequal treatment
by the EPA violated the "national treatment" provision in Article ll of GATT
1947, supra note 1, art. I1, 61 Stat. at A3, 55 U.N.T.S. at 206.
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under GATT of environmental protection measures. The
Appellate Body found against the United States on April 29, 1996,
but did not accept the panel's report on the matter of particular
concern to the United States. 14  Although the import of this
specific decision is subject to debate," one thing is obvious: the
new and improved GATT dispute resolution apparatus is up and
running.
This momentous occasion - the rendering of the first WTO
panel and appellate decisions - provides an ideal occasion for an
historical examination and critical analysis of the GATT legal
system. These are formative days for the new GATT dispute
resolution system, and it is in the best interest of the international
trading system that the infant system take off in the right
direction. By looking to "GATT past," perhaps we can extract
useful principles and apply them to the present and future of this
field. Toward this end, Section 2 of this Article reviews the
development of the international legal system under GATT 1947,
with particular attention to the content and quality of decisions
that emerged from that system. Section 3 describes the key
developments of GATT 1994, the present system as embodied by
the WTO. Finally, Section 4 suggests how to improve the future
of the GATT legal system by focusing on the institutional
participants and processes, aspects that are crucial to the develop-
ment of any legal system.
2. GATT 1947: "GATT PAST"
2.1. Development of Dispute Resolution Under GATT 1947: The
System
To understand the important advances in dispute resolution
procedure wrought by the Uruguay Round Agreements, it is
necessary to consider the history of this field of law.
'4See WTO: Appellate Body Faults U.S. in Gas Case, But Reverses on
Conservation Exception, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 703 (May 1,
1996).
1" In a recent essay, one scholar described the WTO finding as a "non-
event" because, among other things, by the time the WTO issues a final ruling,
the preferential treatment to U.S. producers will likely expire. See Philip M.
Nichols, Extension of Standing in World Trade Organization Disputes to
Nongovernment Parties, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 295, 297-98 n.14 (1996).
1996]
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2.1.1. Article XXIII of the General Agreement
As the GATT system began to function in 1948, it had in its
text only the most primitive mechanism for interpreting and
enforcing its provisions. 6 Paragraph 2 of Article XXIII contains
the following:
If no satisfactory adjustment [of a dispute] is effected
between the contracting parties concerned within a
reasonable time ... the matter may be referred to the
CONTRACTING PARTIES. The CONTRACTING
PARTIES shall promptly investigate any matter so referred
to them and shall make appropriate recommendations to
the contracting parties which they consider to be con-
cerned, or give a ruling on the matter, as appropriate.1
7
Slowly and haltingly, the CONTRACTING PARTIES built upon
the phrase "make appropriate recommendations ... or give a
ruling" 8 and fashioned from it the power to decide disputes
submitted to them for resolution. 9
16 This insufficiency is explained, in part, by the failure of parallel
negotiations attempting to create an International Trade Organization ("ITO").
The ITO would have served a number of functions in connection with the
GATT. Without an organization, the contracting parties were compelled to
extrapolate the elements of a dispute resolution mechanism from a few phrases
in the General Agreement, namely Article XXII. See JACKSON, supra note 2,
at 15-17 (describing attempts to provide substitutes for the ITO).
17 GATT 1947, supra note 1, art. XXII, para. 2, 61 Stat. at A64-65, 55
U.N.T.S. at 268. The use of CONTRACTING PARTIES in all capital letters
is explained supra note 4.
18 Id.
19 The adjudicative function is further implied later in Article XXIII:
If the CONTRACTING PARTIES consider that the circumstances are
serious enough to justify such action, they may authorize a contracting
party or parties to suspend the application to any other contracting
party or parties of such obligations or concessions under this Agree-
ment as they determine to be appropriate in the circumstances.
Id. This sentence is consistent with an adjudicative function, but action by the
CONTRACTING PARTIES is not conditioned upon a finding of a violation
of a GATT obligation. Although this sentence has generally been employed
only where a party violates such an obligation, one could conceive of "cir-
cumstances [that] are serious enough to justify such action" even though no
breach of the Agreement had occurred.
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The essential step in creating a system of adjudication was to
distinguish the adjudicative dispute resolution process from the
conciliation or adjustment process contemplated by most of
Article XXIII. Conciliation and adjustment are methods of
bringing disputants to a solution which each party elects to accept.
Adjudication, on the other hand, contemplates an institutional
process that determines the rights and obligations of the parties.2'
The scope of this sentence, including both adjudicative and conciliatory
functions, is commensurate with paragraph 1 of Article XXIII, which contem-
plates conciliation with a view toward-satisfactory adjustments of disputes. See
i. That paragraph provides for efforts at conciliation if benefits accruing to
contracting parties are being nullified or impaired or if the attainment ot an
objective of the General Agreement is being impeded. See id. The paragraph
contemplates that nullification or impairment of benefits or impeding of GATT
objectives may occur in three different ways:
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations
under this Agreement, or (b) the application by another contracting
party of any measure, whethler or not it conflicts with the provisions
of this Agreement, or (c)the existence of any other situation.
Id. Breach of a duty (obligation) and interference with a right (accrued benefit)
are sound bases for adjudicative dispute resolution. An example of the latter
is the situation in which a tariff binding on a given product has given exporters
an expectation of access to the market of that nation and that expectation is
subsequently impaired by subsidies to domestic production. Even though the
domestic subsidy may not violate GATT, the market effect impairs what may
be described as a benefit accruing under the tariff. The 1988 oilseeds
controversy between the United States and the EC was of such a nature. See
ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE
EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM app. at 558-61 (1993)
[hereinafter HUDEC CASES] (discussing case number 179).
"Existence of any other situation," however, does not give rise to arecognizable ground for an adjudicative proceeding. Nor is it clear what
function a dispute resolution mechanism could have if nations' actions, while
not in conflict with GATT, nevertheless impede attainment of a General Agree-
ment objective. A claim was made once on the basis of the "existence of any
other situation," but the panel that heard the case decided on other grounds
and took no notice of this claim. See id. app. at 445-47 (discussing case number
54). It appears that a claim of "impairment-of-objective-of-the-Agreement" has
never been made. See Pierre Pescatore, Drafting and Analyzing Decisions on
Dispute Settlement, in 1 PIERRE PESCATORE, ET AL., HANDBOOK OF
WTO/GATT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT pt. 2, at 6 (6th ed. 1995) [hereinafter
HANDBOOK].
20 The first paragraph of Article XXIII lists as its sole objective the
achievement of a "satisfactory adjustment of the matter" by the "sympathetic
consideration" of the complaint by the other party. GATT 1947, supra note
1, art. XXIII, para. 1, 61 Stat. at A64, 55 U.N.T.S. at 268. It provides nothing
to support a resolution other than a settlement. The second paragraph
continues in the mode of seeking settlements with the guidance ot the
1996]
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The former does not entail authoritative interpretation of a
governing text, and resolutions are the results of political choices
by the parties. The latter is legal, rather than political, in
character. Although slow to develop, the emergence of an
adjudicative function within the GATT system was a remarkable
achievement. Compared to the legal systems of most nations, the
GATT body of law was frail and inadequate by many measures.
Nonetheless, despite its weaknesses, dispute resolution in an
adjudicative form emerged as a distinct legal system.
2.1.2. The 1979 Understanding
The CONTRACTING PARTIES occasionally recorded their
understandings as to accepted practices for dispute resolution into
formal memoranda. Prior to GATT 1994, the most significant
codification of dispute resolution under the General Agreement
was the 1979 Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation,
Dispute Settlement and Surveillance ("1979 Agreement").'
In an annex to the 1979 Understanding, the CONTRACTING
CONTRACTING PARTIES' "appropriate recommendations." See id. art.
XXIII, para. 2, 61 Stat. at A64-65, 55 U.N.T.S. at 268.
21 See generally Philip M. Nichols, GA TDoctrine, 36 U. VA. J. INT'L L.
(forthcoming May 1996) (discussing the substantive body of GATT law as a
separate and distinct legal doctrine).
' See Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute
Settlement and Surveillance, Nov. 28, 1979, GATT BISD 26th Supp. 210 (1980)
[hereinafter 1979 Understanding]. Between 1979 and the Uruguay Round, the
CONTRACTING PARTIES took two actions. First, in 1982, the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES agreed on a Ministerial Declaration on Dispute
Settlement Procedures. See Ministerial Declaration, Dispute Settlement
Procedures, Nov. 29, 1982, GATT BISD 29th Supp. 9, 13 (1983). Much of this
brief Declaration addresses the issue of delays in the panel process. This
Declaration also mentions, apparently for the first time, the remedial concept
of compensatory adjustment with respect to products not involved in the
dispute. See id. pt. ix, GATT BISD 29th Supp. at 15. Second, two years later,
ostensibly on a trial basis, the CONTRACTING PARTIES ado p ted a
provision for procedures that would result in the establishment of ispute
resolution panels with less delay. See Dispute Settlement Procedures, Nov. 30,
1984, GATT BISD 31st Supp. 9 (1985). After the adoption of this provision,
persons not affiliated with governments could serve as members of the pool of
prospective dispute resolution panelists. See id. at 9.
In 1989, as the Uruguay Round negotiations entered their third year, the
CONTRACTING PARTIES created an interim agreement that foreshadowed
a number of the provisions eventually incorporated into the 1994 Understand-
ing. See Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures,
Apr. 12, 1989, GATT BISD 36th Supp. 61 (1990).
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PARTIES restated their settled practice by declaring the following:
the CONTRACTING PARTIES are obligated to give recommen-
dations or rulings on disputes about the meaning and application
of GATT;' the GATT Council, which generally meets monthly,
"is empowered to act for the CONTRACTING PARTIES,"
which meets annually in accordance with normal GATT prac-
tice;24 the Council has established panels to assist it and these
panels have become the "usual procedure" since 1952 for hearing
disputes and making findings and conclusions; 25 panels are
composed of three to five persons as "agreed upon by the parties
concerned and approved by the GATT Council;"26 and panelists
are "usually selected from permanent delegations" 27 and "expected
to act impartially without instructions from their govern-
ments." 28  Finally, at the conclusion of a panel's work, if the
parties have not reached a mutually satisfactory resolution, the
panel submits a written report to the Council.
29
The 1979 Understanding reaffirmed the CONTRACTING
PARTIES' commitment that "the customary practice of the
GATT in the field of dispute settlement... should be continued
in the future, with the improvements set out [in the Understand-
See 1979 Understanding, supra note 22, Annex 1, para. 1, at 215. The
obligation was said to derive from GATT 1947 Art. XXII:
If no satisfactory adjustment [of a dispute] is effected between the
contracting parties concerned within a reasonable time ... the matter
may be referred to the CONTRACTING PARTIES. The CON-
TRACTING PARTIES shall promptly investigate any matter so
referred to them and shall make appro prate recommendations to the
contracting parties which they consicer to be concerned, or give a
ruling on the matter, as appropriate.
GATT 1947, supra note 1, art. XXIII, para. 2, 61 Stat. at A64-65, 55 U.N.T.S.
at 268. For the purpose of definitive dispute resolution, the key concepts are
"investigate" and "give a ruling." This paragraph also reflects the idea that the
CONTRACTING PARTIES could assist the parties to disputes by giving
"appropriate recommendations." The distinction between a non-binding
recommendation and a binding ruling, although obvious enough now, was
blurred by joining the two in the critical sentence of Article XXIII(2).
24 1979 Understanding, supra note 22, annex, para. 1 n.1, at 215.
5 Id. annex, para. 6(ii), at 217.
26 Id. annex, para. 6(iii), at 217.
Id. annex, para. 6(ii), at 217.
28 Id. annex, para. 6(iii), at 217.
2' See id. annex. para. 6(v), at 218. Panel reports include findings of fact,
applicable GATT provisions, and the rationale of the panel's decision. See id.
1996]
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ing." 3 °  Going beyond settled practice, the Understanding
instituted a number of procedural, improvements for the establish-
ment and functioning of panels.31 The Understanding set specific
time periods for various steps in the panel stage of the process.32
Perhaps the most significant part of the 1979 Understanding,
however, was the commitment that the CONTRACTING
PARTIES would take formal action on panel reports submitted to
the General Council.33 General GATT practice was that the
CONTRACTING PARTIES, or the Council, would take action
only if all parties agree; any individual nation could block
action. 34  Thus, even the losing party to a dispute could block
action by the CONTRACTING PARTIES or the Council.
Without explicitly addressing the norm that action requires
consensus, the 1979 Understanding generally acknowledged the
CONTRACTING PARTIES' responsibility to take action on a
panel report. 35 The agreement was, however, imprecise as to the
time of action: "Reports of panels .. .should be given prompt
consideration by the CONTRACTING PARTIES. The CON-
TRACTING PARTIES should take appropriate action on reports
of panels ... within a reasonable period of time."36
The 1979 Understanding addressed the effect of a ruling by the
Council or the CONTRACTING PARTIES. The General
Agreement lacked provisions for enforcement of such rulings.
The Understanding addressed the post-ruling responsibility of the
CONTRACTING PARTIES in these terms:
The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall keep under surveil-
30 Id. annex, para. 7, at 211.
3' See id. annex, paras. 8-23, at 211-14.
2 See id. annex, paras. 11, 12, 20, at 212, 214.
33 See id. annex, para. 21, at 214. This provision also sets time guidelines
and provides suggestions as to what the CONTRACTING PARTIES should
consider. See id.
34 See G. Richard Shell, The Trade Stakeholders Model and Participation by
Nonstate Parties in the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L.
359, 363-65 (1996) (discussing the "de facto" veto power that the loosing party
enjoyed under the previous system).
" See 1979 Understanding, supra note 22, para. 21, at 214 (noting that the
CONTRACTING PARTIES "should take appropriate action on reports of
panels").
36 Id.
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lance any matter on which they have made recommenda-
tions or given rulings. If the CONTRACTING
PARTIES' recommendations are not implemented within
a reasonable period of time, the contracting party bringing
the case may ask the CONTRACTING PARTIES to
make suitable efforts with a view to finding an appropriate
solution.-
2.1.3. The Tokyo Round Codes
The 1979 Understanding was a product applicable to all of the
nations in the GATT system; it was negotiated without violating
the consensus requirement for GATT decisions in the so-called
Tokyo Round. During that round, a number of proposals for
substantive improvements of GATT law were offered but could
not achieve consensus. Supporters of these reforms created a
number of codes, including what are known as the Antidumping
Code and the Subsidies Code,38 that were open to signature by
any GATT nations but that were binding only on nations electing
to do so. Signatories included all of the major developed nations,
including the United States, the nations of the European Commu-
nity, Japan, and Canada. However, most other nations in the
GATT system did not join.
These codes created dispute settlement mechanisms that
became a second tier of such mechanisms within the GATT
system. Each code-created mechanism was procedurally the same
as the Article XXIII mechanism, but only nations that had joined
a code could be a complainant or respondent in a code-based
dispute. Each code was administered by a "committee" comprised
of the signatory nations. These committees performed the
functions of the CONTRACTING PARTIES or the Council in
the GATT system. The uncertain relationships between the
different tiers of dispute settlement mechanisms and among the
3 Id. para. 22, at 214.
5 See Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI
and XXII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979,
GATT BISD 26th Supp. 56 (1980) [hereinafter Subsidies Code]; Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
Apr. 12, 1979, GATT BISD 26th Supp. 171 (1980) [hereinafter Antidumping
Code].
1996]
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separate code mechanisms eventually became a source of dispute.
2.1.4. GATT Case Law and Commentaries
Following the Tokyo Round, activity in the GATT system of
dispute resolution increased considerably and reached a level of
maturity, but the activity took place mostly in the dark. The
primary materials were fully accessible to only a small body of
experts. Consequently, writings about the GATT system
generally and about panel decisions tended to be relatively
shallow.
Fortunately, the accessibility to and thoughtful analysis of
GATT law has improved. As the Uruguay Round was drawing
to a close, several scholars published a number of important and
valuable books and articles dealing with the history of GATT
dispute resolution. Outstanding among these is a book by
Professor Robert E. Hudec.39 Professor Hudec is one of the
most respected authorities of that subject in the United States, or
perhaps the world.4° Hudec makes accessible a rich store of
detailed knowledge about the history of GATT dispute resolution.
Hudec's most important contribution is a comprehensive
overview of all of the 207 controversies that had been decided in
the GATT system through the early 1990S.41 Each of the cases
is described in summary form, detailing the complaint, legal claim,
commercial issue, disposition, and ultimate result in each case.42
Hudec also presents an extensive statistical analysis of these cases
in terms of both the substance of the disputes, the procedures
followed within the GATT system, and the ultimate outcomes.
43
39 See HUDEC CASES, supra note 19.
4 For earlier works published by Professor Hudec, see HUDEC DIPLOMA-
CY, supra note 2; Robert E. Hudec, GA TT Dispute Settlement After the Tokyo
Round: An Unfinished Business, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 145 (1980); Robert [E.
Hudec, The GA7T Legal System: A Diplomat's Jurisprudence, 4 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 615 (1970); Robert E. Hudec, Reforming GATT Adjudication
Procedures: The Lessons of the DISC Case, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1443 (1988).
41 See HUDEC CASES, supra note 19 app. at 373-585. Hudec collected and
categorized the case law by the date of the filing of a complaint. Using this
method of dating the cases, his collection cuts ow with cases initiated prior to
1990. Decisions in these cases, which Hudec reports, extend into the decade
of the 1990s.
42 See id.
43 See id.
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The data, broken down into decades,44 reveal trends that oc-
curred within the first half century of GATT experience. These
data are accompanied by Hudec's rich narrative account of the
history of dispute resolution within the GATT system.45 Hudec
imparts a sense of the interplay of political and economic forces,
the drama of sovereign nations groping for answers to novel
international legal problems, and the slow and tortuous movement
toward creating a body of governing law.46
Two other recent publications complement Professor Hudec's
book. Adjudication of International Trade Disputes in International
and National Economic Law4 is a 1992 compilation of studies
edited by Professors Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann and Giinther
Jaenicke. Some of the studies, most notably one by Professor
Petersmann himself, address the GATT dispute settlement system
broadly. The second work comes from Justice Pierre Pescatore,
who published the Handbook of WTO/GATT Dispute Settlement
("Handbook")41 with assistance from Professors William J.
Davey49 and Andreas F Lowenfeld. s° The Handbook, a loose-
leaf book with supplements, has been and hopefully will continue
to be updated by Pescatore. The Handbook contains Pescatore's
summaries of rulings made in the decided cases together with his
general comments on the GATT dispute resolution system. A
major contribution of the Handbook is that it fully reprints the
4 Hudec assigns cases to the decade in which the complaint was initiated.
For these purposes, Hudec treats the first 12 years of GATT history, 1948-1959,
as the decade of the 1950s. The following three decades he examines are 1960-
1969, 1970-1979, and 1980-1989. See id. at 287.
4s See id. at 29-57, 129-77, 199-270.
46 Hudec also discusses and critiques the quality of some of the GATT case
law. See, eg., id. at 130-36 (analyzing the five cases in which the complaint was
brought before the Tokyo round but settled afterwards). Hudec's analyses of
individual decisions are invariably interesting and worthwhile. See, e.g., id. at
59-100 (discussing the details of the DISC case).
47 ADJUDICATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE DISPUTES IN INTERNA-
TIONAL AND NATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann &
Giinther Jaenicke eds. 1992) [hereinafter PETERSMANN ADJUDICATION].
41 See HANDBOOK, supra note 19.
41 Professor Davey contributed an overview on the GATT system. See
William J. Davey, The ITO / GA 7T World Trading System: An Overview, in
1 HANDBOOK, supra note 19, pt. 1, at 7.
50 For the brief preface written by Professor Lowenfeld, see Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, First Thoughts on Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organiza-
tion, Preface to 1 HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at vii.
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findings and conclusions of decisions in the GATT system."
In their own ways, Hudec and Petersmann describe the entire
corpus of controversies that have been submitted and decided in
the GATT system through the early 1990s. Hudec provides a
catalogue of all 207 cases initiated before 1990 together with a
useful summary of each of the matters: 2 Petersmann provides
a chronological list and brief summary of cases submitted to the
CONTRACTING PARTIES or the Council through November,
1990."3 Petersmann describes nine cases, initiated in 1990, that
are not in Hudec's profile m Pescatore's contribution to describ-
ing the corpus of GATT case law is confined to the ninety-five
cases in which final rulings were made. 5 He provides a short
summary of each decision."
Resolution of these controversies within the GATT system has
produced a substantial body of reasoned case decisions. As would
be expected in any system of dispute resolution, many of these
GATT disputes terminated short of panel decision through
settlements or withdrawal of complaints. 7 Nonetheless panels
have issued written reports in a substantial number of disputes.
51 See, e.g., 2 HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at DD71/1 - DD71/5 (reprinting
the findings and conclusions of a dispute over Norwegian import restrictions
on apples and pears).
52 See HUDEC CASES, supra note 19 app. at 373-585.
51 See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, GA 7TDispute Settlement Proceedings Under
Article XXIII 1948-1990: Chronological List of Complaints Submitted under GA TT
Article XXIII to the GA TT CONTRA CTING PARTIES or the GA 77 Council,
in PETERSMANN ADJUDICATION, supra note 47, annex.
" See id. Petersmann's total list contains only 149 cases. See id. The
difference between the case lists presented by Petersmann and Hudec results
principally from Petersmann's omission of disputes initiated under the dispute
resolution mechanisms set up by some of the GATT nations in the GATT
codes, notably the Antidumping Code and the Subsidies Code. In disputes
under these codes, panel reports do not come before the GATT Council or the
CONTRACTING PARTIES. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
See CISG art. 74, supra note 1, S. TREATY DOc. No.
9 at 37, 19 I.L.M. at 688.See CISG art. 74, supra note 1, S. TREATY DOc. No.
9 at 37, 19 I.L.M. at 688."s See 1 HANDBOOK, supra note 19, pt. 2, at 3.
56 See id. at pt. 2 CS1-CS95. The Secretariat of GATT has compiled, from
time to time, an Analytical Index of each article of the General Agreement.
The Analystical Index has become an important reference tool. The most
recent edition is GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND
PRACTICE (6th ed. 1995).
57 See HtJDEC CASES, supra note 19 app. at 423 (discussing case number 11).
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Overall, Hudec counts eighty panel reports in this corpus of
law."8 In a further eight cases, a plenary body59 acted without
the aid of prior consideration by a panel.'
Four notable conclusions can be drawn from Hudec's compila-
tion of GATT caselaw: (1) the amount of GATT litigation grew
substantially in the 1980s;61 (2) among the cases that resulted in
panel decision, the success rate of complainants has always been
high and became even higher in the last decade reported;62 (3)
complainants whose claims were denied by panels rarely sought
to prevail in the plenary body notwithstanding the panels'
views;63 and (4) GATT plenary bodies have tended not to act as
"8 See id. at 274. Hudec notes that 88 complaints resulted in rulings, eight
of which were not panel rulings. See id. n.3.
9 udec defines the plenary body as the actor that has final authority in
administering the trade agreement under which a complaint is filed. The
plenary body for GATT is either the CONTRACTING PARTIES or the
GATT Council. The plenary body for the GATT Codes are the committees
that those documents establish. See id. n.2.
60 See id. n.3.
61 By Hudec's account, of the 207 proceedings initiated between 1948 and
1989, 115 were complaints filed in the 1980s. See id. at 287. Of that number,
47 concluded with actual rulings, representing more than half of the 88 rulings
Hudec examines. The remaining 68 were settled (28 cases), or withdrawn (40
cases).
62 See id. at 289. Overall, panels ruled in favor of the complaining party
in 68 cases reported, a success rate of 77%. In cases from the 1980s, panels
found violations of GATT in 40 cases, or 85% of the panel rulings. See id.
63 No occasion for the plenary body to act would arise if the parties settled
the controversy after a panel decision had been rendered. Hudec notes that
there were only two cases (his case numbers 91 and 102) in which the
complainant sought to have panel rulings of no-violation set aside. See id. app.
at 479, 489.
The former, a 1979 case by the United States against Spain, involved
quantity restraints on imported soybean oil allegedly instituted by the Spanish
government to protect the market for domestically produced olive oil. The
panel found no violation of Article M1. The Unite States asked the GATT
Council to "note" the panel report rather than "adopt" it because of panel error
in its interpretation of Article Ell, but the United States also stated that it was
withdrawing its complaint against Spain. See id. app. at 479-81.
The latter was a 1981 action by Canada which contended that the United
States violated GATT in using 19 U.S.C. S 337 to find that automobile parts
made in Canada infringed a U.S. patent. The underlying claim was one of
denial of national treatment because domestic United States intellectual
property law applied differently than S 337, which applies only to imported
goods. The panel found for the United States under an exception in Article
XX(d). See GATT 1947, supra note 1, art. XX(d), 61 Stat. at A61, 55 U.N.T.S.
at 262. Canada and others argued in the GATT Council that the panel's
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appellate tribunals - rarely has a plenary body modified or
reversed a panel on the ground that the panel erred in its legal
analysis or its factual findings."
Final decisions in favor of complainants are not self-enforcing
in any legal system, but enforcement is a particular difficulty in
GATT litigation. GATT plenary bodies lack power to enforce
their rulings. Compliance or noncompliance is the choice of the
nations against whom decisions have .been rendered. Hudec
therefore devotes considerable attention to accounting for the
eventual outcomes of cases in which panels found violations of
GATT. In doing this, Hudec divided the cases into three groups
which he labelled "full satisfaction," "partial satisfaction," and
"negative outcome."65  Hudec's assignment of cases to these
groups was, necessarily, somewhat subjective, but his judgments
were guided by his considerable experience.
The results, somewhat surprisingly, indicate a recent decline in
the extent of compliance with panel decisions.66 From 1948 until
the cases of the 1980s, in cases with known rulings in favor of
complainants, Hudec classified twenty-seven (100%) as ending with
full satisfaction or partial satisfaction; none had a "negative
outcome," and most (eighty-six percent) were in the "full satisfac-
reading of Article XX was wrong. The Council "adopted" the panel report but
added a written understanding that Council action did not foreclose further
challenges to the validity of the relevant section. See HUDEC CASES, supra note
19 app. at 489-90. In a subsequent case, the panel found S 337 to be violative
of Article I. See id. app. at 547 (discussing case number 162).
64 See HuDEc CASES, supra note 19, at 274 n.3. Since GATT practice
allows each panel to determine its own procedures, it does not appear that
parties challenge panel decisions for procedural irregularity.
65 See HUDEC CASES, supra note 19, at 276. The category of "negative
outcome includes two subcategories: cases in which violators took no remedial
action and cases in which they superficially satisfied the claims but only after
the complainants had acceded to certain demands. See id. at 276-77.
66 For this part of the statistical profile, Hudec did not distinguish between
panel decisions adopted by a GATT plenary body and panel reports not
adopted by a plenary body. He classified instances of noncompliance with all
panel reports finding violations of GATT law, whether or not adopted by a
plenary body, as cases with a "negative outcome." Implicit in that system of
classification is Hudec's judgment about the lack of legal significance in rulings
by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, the Council, or Committees. That
judgment is not shared by other students of GATT dispute resolution, particu-
larly Pierre Pescatore. He declares: "[Planel reports which did not meet with
the [CONTRACTING PARTIES'] approval ... have no legal authority.
Authors who rely on such material are misleading their readers." 1 HAND-
BOOK, supra note 19, pt. 2, at 25.
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tion" group.67 This picture, however, changed substantially in
the decade of the 1980s. During this period, Hudec placed seven
cases (eighteen percent) in the category of negative outcomes.
68
67 See HUDEC CASES, supra note 19, at 290.
6, See id. Somewhat surprisingly, Hudec's seven cases of "failure" are not
coincident with the seven cases from the 1980s in which the losing party
blocked adoption of panel reports. Only two of the "blocked" panel decisions
appear in the category of"negative outcomes." The former involved
countervailing duties imposed by Canada on boneless beef imported from the
European Community; the latter involved the imposition by the United States
of antidumping duties on steel pipes and tubes imported from Sweden. See id.
app. at 533, 572 (discussing case numbers 149 and 191).
In five of Hudec's "negative outcome" cases, the panel reports had been
adopted by the plenary body. See id. app. at 482, 512, 547, 569, and 575
(discussing case numbers 93, 125, 162, 188, and 195).
There are five cases where adoption of panel reports was blocked, but
which Hudec excluded from his group of "negative outcomes." Hudec
questioned the soundness of the panel's reasoning in two of these. See id. app.
at 493, 502 (discussing case numbers 105 and 113). In two others, respondents
complied with the panels' rulings even though not adopted by a plenary body.
See id. app. at 496, 518 (discussing case numbers 107 and 132). The fifth case
involved the Airbus subsidy controversy; after blocking adoption of the panel
report, the European Nations entered into an agreement with the complainant,
the United States, that had the prospect of resolving the broad problem of
aircraft subsidies. See id. app. at 576 (discussing case number 195).
By Hudec's account, the "negative outcomes" in these seven cases were
exacerbated by "negative outcomes" in an additional nine cases (thirteen
percent) in which complaints were withdrawn for inadequate reasons. See id.
at 292. Seven of these were from the 1980s, in which a "probably valid"
complaint was withdrawn after impasse or settled by complainants' acceding to
violators' arm-twisting. See id. In a further eighteen cases, most from the
1980s, Hudec classified the outcome as "negative" because, in his judgment, the
reasons for withdrawal were not "adequate." Hudec explained his reasoning
this way:
If the complaint has been abandoned in circumstances indicating that
the complainant government gave up because it did not believe GATT
law would be able to enforce the claim, we have a case of potential
legal failure. There are basically two withdrawal situations that fit this
description, corresponding to the two kinds of "negative outcome"
..I. The first situation is the case that simply ens in impasse, that
is, the defendant refuses to change the measure complained of, and
after a while the complainant just gives up without seeking to move
the procedure forward to a legal ruling. The second situation involves
complaints directed at an arm-twisting trade restriction; the potentially
negative outcome occurs when, after filing the GATT complaint, the
complaining government subsequently gives in to the arm-twisting,
accedes to the demand, and then withdraws the GATT complaint
because the arm-twisting restriction, having served its purpose, has
been terminated by the defendant government.
Id. at 281-82.
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Hudec classified five cases (thirteen percent) as complete defiance
(no action); in two cases (five percent) the losing party complied
but only after the complainant paid a "price" to which the
violator was not entitled under the ruling or by GATT law.69
This increase in noncompliance and "negative outcomes" provided
an impetus to restructure the GATT dispute resolution system.
2.2. The Substance of Panel-Created GATT Law
The collected body of decisions rendered by GATT panels and
the plenary bodies, added to the text, has become the substantive
corpus of GATT law. It is helpful to classify the official texts of
the General Agreement and the Codes as "primary" GATT law,
and the collected decisions of the dispute resolution mechanisms
as "secondary" GATT law. The time has come to give serious
attention to the content and quality of this body of secondary
GATT law. Fundamental questions arise in two sets: content
and quality. The first set of questions explores the contours and
dimensions of this new body of case law. What is the relationship
between the primary, positive law of the GATT system, the
General Agreement and the GATT Codes, and these secondary
decisions? And how has the process of dispute resolution
contributed to the interpretation of the texts? A second set of
questions is quite different. It asks for assessment of the quality
of the reasoning and results of the secondary decisions. Are panel
rulings "sound"? Are the decisions and the reasons, on their
merits, "right"? At this historical juncture, the lessons learned
from the answers to these questions provide a unique opportunity
to incorporate positive changes into the new system. After
reviewing the contours and quality of GATT rulings, this Article
suggests some possible structural changes, as well as variations in
external attitudes that can give meaningful effect to the lessons
learned.
2.2.1. The Contours of Panel Rulings
One of the greatest contributions of Hudec's work is its
comprehensive picture of the entire corpus of GATT law
generated by the dispute resolution system. Hudec includes a
useful table in an appendix of the distribution of GATT provi-
69 See id. at 290.
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sions cited in complaints, which illustrates how frequently - or
infrequently - complaining parties cite to certain GATT provi-
sions." From this table of distribution, a reader can also deter-
mine the distribution of various GATT provisions in the resulting
panel rulings. Pescatore includes a similar table in his Hand-
book.1
2.2.1.1. Action Versus Non-Action
Hudec's table reveals that a few GATT articles have been
litigated extensively, while others have received only minimal
consideration in this process. Articles I, II, III, XI, and XXIII of
the GATT have been cited most frequently,7 2 The numerous
references to Article XXIII is because that article is the framework
for the GATT 1947 dispute resolution system.73 The other
frequently cited articles contain fundamental principles of
substantive GATT law. Article I presents the most favored nation
principle, which basically precludes discrimination in trade mea-
sures; 4 Article II provides the basic framework for tariff "conces-
sions" made by the contracting parties;75 Article III establishes
the principle of national treatment: once goods have been
imported into the territory of a contracting party, that party may
not discriminate between those goods and goods produced
domestically; 6 and finally, Article XI proscribes quantity
restraints on imports or exports.77
70 See HUDEC CASES, supra note 19 app. at 407-11. The table lists each
GATT provision without distinguishing between references that constitute part
of a panel's "holding" and otFers that describe issues raised by one of the
parties but not reviewed by the panel. See id. Nonetheless, Hudec's table
greatly facilitates the location of GATT provisions for anyone interested in
working with this body of law.
71 See 1 HANDBOOK, supra note 19, pt. 2, at index 2/1 - 2/3. Since the
Handbook includes only actions by plenary bodies, the index of Articles refers
only to citations in panel reports. See id.
72 See HUDEC CASES, supra note 19 app. at 407-09.
'' See supra note 19 and accompanying discussion.
7 See GATT 1947, supra note 1, art. I, 61 Stat. at A12-13, 55 U.N.T.S. at
196-200.
s See id. art. I, 61 Stat. at A14-17, 55 U.N.T.S. at 196-200. These conces-
sions are specified in schedules attached to the General Agreement. See id. 61
Stat. at A91-1362, 56-61 U.N.T.S passim.
76 See id. art. 11, 61 Stat. at A18-19, 55 U.N.T.S. at 204-08.
77 See id. art. XI, 61 Stat. at A32-34, 55 U.N.T.S. at 224-28.
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The case distribution reveals that other important - and
controversial - areas of GATT law have not been the subject of
significant panel consideration.7  The GATT article on
antidumping, Article VI,7" as well as the GATT Antidumping
Code, 0 have only substantially come before panels five times.
81
This sparsity of antidumping cases within the GATT system is
surprising in light of the considerable international ferment about
arbitrary and protectionist administration of national antidumping
laws.
8 2
The provision in Article XIX regulating nations' resort to
emergency action, sometimes called the "escape clause," 3
represents another area mostly neglected by GATT panels.
Although commentators have devoted extensive theoretical
analysis and political discussion to Article XIX and the economic
rationales for emergency action, 4 only one case from the 1980s
78 See HUDEC CASES, supra note 19 app. at 407-11.
71 See GATT 1947, supra note 1, art. VI, 61 Stat. at A23-25, 55 U.N.T.S.
at 212-16.
80 See Antidumping Code, supra note 38.
81 See HUDEC CASES, supra note 19 app. at 407-09 (referring to case
numbers 27, 58, 133, 188, and 191). Other cases can be excluded from this pool
because the merits of the cases were not reached in the decision. A panel was
established but rendered no decision in case number 197. See id. at 578. In two
other cases, complaints raised issues of antidumping law but panels were not
constituted. See id. at 515, 579 (referring to case numbers 128 and 199).
Petersmann has published an article describing five panel decisions that
have arisen out of antidumping proceedings under Article VI of GATT and the
1979 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement.
See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Settlement of International and National Trade
Disputes Through the GATT The Case of Antidumping Law, in PETERSMANN
ADJUDICATION, supra note 47, at 77-138. Petersmann omitted Hudec case
number 58, but included another case which began in he 1990s and, therefore,
is not one of Hudec's cases. See id. at 117-18.
82 Petersmann observes that GATT dispute settlement proceedings could
have provided a progressive elaboration of the substance of Article VI and the
Antidumping Code, but did not do so. See PETERSMANN ADJUDICATION,
supra note 47, at 135. Although he offers no explanation for the relative lack
of complaints and rulings in this area, he concludes that, "[i]f the Uruguay
Round negotiations should fail to produce more precise and more balanced
antidumping rules, it seems likely that exporting countries will have increasing
recourse to the dispute settlementprocedures in order to prevent protectionist
abuses of antidumping rules .... Id. at 137-38.
83 See GATT 1947, supra note 1, art. XIX, 61 Stat. at A58-60, 55 U.N.T.S.
at 258-62.
84 See, e.g., Alan 0. Sykes, Protectionism as a "Safeguarde: A Positive
Analysis of the GATT "Escape Clause" with Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI.
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involves this article, and it did not result in a panel decision.8"
The relative infrequency of complaints on these subjects and
others merits further inquiry, evaluation, and scholarly analysis.
The absence of rulings is attributable, of course, to national
governments' electing not to file complaints. This superficial
explanation for non-action is insufficient, however, because it fails
to ask why the governments choose not to act. Hudec did not set
out to explore "why the dog didn't bark," but he did, to his
merit, frame these questions and provide detailed procedures with
which to study and analyze these questions.
2.2.1.2. General Trends Emerging From GAYT 1947
Adjudication
Hudec subjects panel litigation of GATT provisions to a range
of interesting statistical analyses. Most importantly, he categorizes
the issues litigated based on the nature of government conduct
that is allegedly in violation of the GATT or a GATT Code.86
Hudec divides these "trade measures" into six categories: tariffs,
nontariff barriers ("NTBs"), trade distorting subsidies, discrimina-
tory tariff measures, discriminatory NTBs, and antidumping or
countervailing duties.87 Organizing cases around these categories
reveals considerable differences in the number and significance of
the cases with at least four general trends emerging.
Although tariff controversies were more significant early in
the life of GATT, they have become less significant over time.
Two kinds of tariff disputes generally arise: (1) levels of tariff
duties and (2) classification of goods for tariff purposes. Problems
L. REV. 255 (1991).
11 See HuDEc CASES, supra note 19 app. at 507 (discussing case number
117). The EG instituted this action against Switzerland, for briefly restricting
import of table grapes. The restriction expired before a panel was established-
See id. The only Article XIX case that went to decision found that the United
States had not violated this provision by responding to a sharp surge of imports
of ladies' fur hats by raising tariffs on a type of fur hat produced more
efficiently abroad. See id. app. at 424-25 (discussing case number 13). A
workingparty, rather than a panel, rendered this decision. The contesting
nations had representatives on the working party. See id. Three other
complaints prior to 1980 stated claims under Article XIX, but no panel
decisions resulted. See id. at 429, 443, 470-71 (referring to case numbers 21, 49,
and 83).
86 See id. at 337.
87 See id. at 337-38.
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arise concerning levels of tariff duties when, after a tariff rate has
been bound, a nation increases the amount it demands from
importers. For example, in 1986, the United States imposed a
"user fee" in addition to tariff duties. Although this was ostensi-
bly to pay the costs of customs service, the amount of the fee
exceeded those costs, thus violating tariff bindings under the
GATT.88
With regard to the second type of tariff disputes, classification
of goods, in all tariff regimes tariff rates vary with goods'
classification. Inevitably, this causes controversies about the
proper classification of goods. Disputes of this kind have arisen
frequently under U.S. law,9 but only a few have been litigated
in the GATT dispute resolution system. Global adoption of a
single "harmonized" system of classification will diminish
occasions for disputes of this kind, but new products continually
come onto the market and their classification under existing tariff
bindings will inevitably give rise to controversies.
Hudec classifies the majority of cases as involving nontariff
barriers.9" The primary GATT issue raised by these cases
concerns the meaning and application of Article XI, which
provides for the general elimination of quantity restrictions." In
cases initiated since 1979, most of the successful complaints have
88 See id. app. at 538; see also GATT 1947, supra note 1, art. II, .para. 2, 61
Stat. at A15, 55 U.N.T.S. at 202 (restricting a contracting party to imposition
of "fees or other charges commensurate with the cost of services rendered").
Any fee which exceeds the internal cost of those services is a violation of the
principle contained in Article II.
89 Much of the judicial work of the Court of International Trade and the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit involves issues of this kind.
90 See HUDEC CASES, supra note 19, at 338. This category accounts for
more than half of the complaints, rulings, and rulings finding violations. See
id.
9' See GATT 1947, supra note 1, art. XI, para. 1, 61 Stat. at A32-33, 55
U.N.T.S. 224-26 ("No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties taxes or
other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export licenses
or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party
on the importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting
party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the
territory of any oier contracting party."). Related to this general provision
are the articles that permit governments, in limited circumstances, to restrict
access to their markets. See, e.g., id., art. XX, 61 Stat. at A60-63, 55 U.N.T.S.
at 262-64.
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challenged domestic barriers to imports of agricultural products.92
One of the most significant recent NTB cases arose from the
1986 United States-Japan semiconductor agreement, which
restricted semiconductor exports from Japan to the United States
and improved access in Japan for U.S. exports. Not surprisingly,
since the global market for semiconductors has become hotly
contested among the most developed nations, the EC challenged
this bilateral agreement as an impermissible attempt to manage
trade in these products.93 The GATT panel ruled that provisions
of the bilateral agreement restricted Japanese exports in violation
of Article XI.94 The panel further held that provisions opening
the Japanese market to U.S. products did not violate the most
favored nation principle of Article I or place EC exporters at a
competitive disadvantage that would nullify or impair its expecta-
tions of access to the Japanese market.95
Government subsidies to domestic producers, other than
subsidies targeted at exports, may prevent imported goods from
effectively competing with the subsidized goods. In that sense,
domestic subsidies might be considered nontariff barriers. Other
government subsidies have the purpose or effect of stimulating
exports. Several GATT articles (Articles VI and XVI) and the
GATT Subsidies Code specifically address the matters of domestic
and export subsidies.96 Although most of these cases arose in the
agriculture sector, one of the most significant subsidy cases
involved Germany's subsidy of the Airbus enterprise.97
The long-running controversy between the United States and
the EC over the latter's oilseed subsidies led to two important
92 See HUDEc CASES, supra note 19, at 333. Twenty of the 45 violation
rulings involved products from this sector, notably beef, apples, sugar, and fish.
See id. at 333. For example, this provision provided the basis for a successful
complaint by the United States against Japanese quotas on import of twelve
groups of agricultural products. See id. app. at 531-33 (discussing case number
148).
9' See id. app. at 541 (discussing case number 156).
9' See id. app. at 542 (discussing the rule in case number 156).
95 See id.
96 See GATT 1947, supra note 1, arts. VI, XVI, 61 Stat. at A23-25, A51-52,
55 U.N.T.S. at 212-16, 250.
97 See HUDEc CASES, supra note 19 app. at 576-78 (referring to case number
196 in which the panel ruled that the exchange rate guarantee given by the
German government to a private buyer of the government's share in Airbus
was a violative export subsidy).
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panel rulings on the relationship between the subsidy provisions
and other provisions of GATT law. 8 This controversy arose
after the EC created a zero-tariff on oilseeds in 1962 and thereafter
granted subsidies to European processors for processing oilseeds
produced within the Community.99 In the initial case, the
GATT panel held that the processor subsidies violated the
"national treatment" requirement of Article HL.'o After the EC
modified its subsidy program to make payments directly to
producers, the panel was reconvened to issue a second report.
This second report held the subsidy unlawful on the ground that
the direct subsidy nullified and impaired U.S. expectations of
exporting oilseeds to Europe under the zero-tariff binding.01
Neither panel decision was based on Article VI or XVI of GATT;
indeed, in reaching the latter decision the panel assumed that the
subsidy in question was lawful under those provisions. The panel
found the nontariff barrier effect of the subsidies on imports
dispositive on the issue.
As previously mentioned, only five panel decisions since 1948
comprise the thin body of cases and rulings on antidumping
law.10 2 Only four panels have issued rulings on countervailing
duties.
In both antidumping and countervailing duty cases, most
findings of a violation arise from the requirement that duties may
not be imposed absent finding of material injury to the domestic
producers of products like those being imported. One of these
cases ruled that the domestic petitioners in an antidumping case
9' See id. app. at 558-61 (discussing case number 179).
91 See id. app. at 559.
1(o See id.
101 See id. app. at 560. The second panel report, referring to a 1955
decision, recalled that:
even if subsidies are permitted under the General Agreement they are
nevertheless recognized as being capable of distorting international
trade and impairing the benefits accruing to contracting parties under
the General Agreement in unacceptable ways. . . . [A] contracting
party which has negotiated a concession under Article II is presumed
railing evidence to the contrary, to have a reasonable expectation that
the value of the concession will not be nullified or impaired by the
subsequent introduction or increase of a domestic subsidy on the
product concerned.
2 HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at DD77/19.
102 See discussion, supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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did not sufficiently represent the domestic industry; thus giving
rise to a concern regarding their standing to assert the claims
contained in the complaint. 3 Two of the countervailing duty
cases involved a related problem: whether subsidies given to
processors can be countervailed because the primary producers
suffer an injury. For example, are subsidies on wine
countervailable as injurious to grape growers?1°4
One of the more difficult questions in current antidumping
law arises when, following imposition of an antidumping duty, an
exporter physically changes the product in some way. Is the
imposing authority required to institute a new set of proceedings
to consider whether the goods, as changed, are being dumped?
Strategic moves to avoid duties are referred to as circumvention,
and the corresponding response is termed anticircumvention. The
validity, under GATT law, of various potential anticircumvention
measures is unclear.
105
3. GATT 1994: "GATT PRESENT"
In producing GATT 1994, the governments participating in
103 See HUDEC CASES supra note 19 app. at 572-73 (discussing case number
191). Because of their multinational operations, U.S. firms often refrain from
joining antidumping or countervailing duty actions.
104 See HUDEC CASES, supra note 19 app. at 522-23 (discussing case number
137, which held that a U.S. statute defining the wine industry to include the
growers of grapes to a be a violative subsidy) . Another example involved com-
plaint by cattle producers of subsidies on beef. See id. at 533-34 (discussing case
number 149, which held that cattle producers could not be considered
producers of frozen beef).
... One instance of this problem was presented in a recent antidumping
case in which the EC imposed antidumping duties on a number of manufac-
tured goods from Japan. See HUDEC CASES, supra note 19 app. at 569-71
(discussing case number 188). In response, Japanese firms exported only parts
and components for assembly within the EC. See id. The EC countered this
move by imposing an antidumping duty on the value of the imported parts and
components incorporated in the assembled products as the final products left
the assembly plant. See id. app. at 569. The GATT panel ruled that this
constituted an internal tax inconsistent with the Article III requirement of
nondiscriminatory national treatment. See id. app. at 570. The EC continued
to collect the duties notwithstanding adoption of the panel report. The EC
said it had deferred compliance pending completion of the Uruguay Round
negotiations, which sought to frame a GATT position on anticircumvention.
See id. app. at 570-71. The CONTRACTING PARTIES concluded the
Uruguay Round without reaching any agreement on anticircumvention beyond
agreeing to consider the issue in the near future. This case demonstrates the
significant uncertainty in GATT responses to anticircumvention.
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the Uruguay Round negotiations accomplished a great deal.
Among other things, they established the WTO, which provides
an institutional framework for resolution of all disputed matters
within GATT.106  Governance of the WTO is vested in a
Ministerial Conference and a General Council, both composed of
representatives of all the Members." 7 Article III of the Agree-
ment provides that the organization shall administer the Under-
standing on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes ("1994 Understanding") annexed to the Agreement.0 8
In the dispute settlement role, the General Council will convene
as the Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB") which will have its own
chairman and rules of procedure. 9
3.1. Changes to the Dispute Resolution System
The 1994 Understanding, to be administered by the DSB,
makes profound changes in the GATT dispute resolution system.
Most of these changes address the issues and concerns raised by
Hudec, Pescatore, Petersmann, and other scholars of dispute
settlements under GATT 1947. The 1994 Understanding begins
by recognizing that the new system derives from experience:
"Members affirm their adherence to the principles for the
management of disputes heretofore applied under Articles XXII
and XXIHI of GATT 1947, and the rules and procedures as further
elaborated and modified herein.""0 Although a full account of
the 1994 Understanding cannot be presented here, the following
synopsis describes the most important changes."'
3.1.1. Panels
The essentials of the panel process remain unchanged in
106 See GATT 1994, supra note 4, art. I1, 33 I.L.M. at 1144-45.
107 Nations and other governments that become party to the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization are denominated as "Members."
See id. art. IV, 33 I.L.M. at 1145. The Ministerial Conference is required to
meet at least once every two years. The General Council meets more
frequently, "as appropriate." Id.
10 See 1994 Understanding, supra note 10, art. I, para. 3, 33 I.L.M. at
1226.
1"9 See GATT 1994, supra note 4, art. IV, para. 3, 33 I.L.M. at 1145.
10 1994 Understanding, supra note 10, art. III, para. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 1227.
111 The new system will not apply to ongoing disputes. Its application is
expressly prospective. See id. art. 3, para. 11, 33 I.L.M. at 1228.
[Vol. 17:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol17/iss2/5
GA TT ENFORCEMENT
GATT 1994. The principal function of panels continues to be
assisting the DSB, successor to the GATT Council or Committees,
in discharging its responsibilities.112  Normally, panels will be
established with three members.' Under the old system, each
panel was free to set its own procedures. The 1994 Understanding
sets out default working procedures that govern unless a panel
specifically determines otherwise.11 4  The working procedures
dictate that: panels meet in closed session; the materials they
receive are confidential;".. the public has no access to the panel
process;.. and opinions expressed in panel reports by individual
panelists are anonymous.
1 17
Although panels receive submissions from the parties to the
dispute,1 ' they are not required to rely exclusively on informa-
tion and arguments presented by the parties." 9 Once a matter
has been referred to a panel, it has the right to seek information
and technical advice from any individual or body which it deems
appropriate. 2°
The contracting parties occasionally attempted to assign timely
parameters for the length of panel proceedings under GATT 1947.
In 1966, they agreed that a panel should report within 60
days, 21 but the 1979 Understanding noted that the proceedings
generally ran from three to nine months.'2 Under GATT 1994,
a six month time frame is generally provided for the panel to
process a complaint, 123 but extensions of time are permitted, 24
112 See id. arts 6-7, 33 I.L.M. at 1230-31.
1 See id. art. 8, para. 5, 33 I.L.M. at 1231.
114 See id. app. 3, 33 I.L.M. at 1245-46.
15 See id.
116 See Steve Charnovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations
in the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 331, 333 (1996).
117 See 1994 Understanding, supra note 10, art. 14, para. 3, 33 I.L.M. at
1235.
... See i art. 12, para. 6, 33 I.L.M. at 1233.
119 See id. art. 13, para. 2, 33 I.L.M. at 1234 (stating that "[p]anels may seek
information from any relevant source").
121 See id. Provision is made in the Understanding for the establishment of
expert review groups on scientific or technical questions. See id.
121 See Conciliation Procedures Under Article XXIII, Apr. 5, 1966, GATT
BISD 14th Supp. 18, at 19 (1967).
1 See 1979 Understanding, supra note 22, at 214.
'z See 1994 Understanding, supra note 10, art. 12, para. 8, 33 I.L.M. at
1234.
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and a shorter period may be set if matters are urgent." 5
The qualifications that an individual panel member must
possess had not been stated before GATT 1994. The 1994
Understanding defines, in general terms, the expected qualifica-
tions of panel members, but significantly it does not specify that
all panelists must be lawyers or even that each panel have at least
one lawyer. 26 It may be expected that, as in the past, many
government officials will be assigned to duty on panels, although
not in matters in which their governments are parties." The
Understanding declares that such panelists serve in their individual
capacities, not as government representatives. 2  It further
specifies that a panelist's own government must not determine or
even influence the ultimate decision. 29
All panel reports will be presented to the DSB. The pre-
scribed content of panel reports remains unchanged.30 Overall,
the 1994 Understanding creates a single composite process for all
the dispute resolution mechanisms. This will eliminate the
confusion, and potential for impasse, resulting from the sometimes
overlapping jurisdictions of the multiple dispute resolution
mechanisms that existed after the Tokyo Round codes became
part of the GATT system.
3.1.2. Appellate Body
The single most dramatic change in the 1994 Understanding
124 See id. art. 12, para. 9, 33 I.L.M. at 1234.
125 See id. art. 12, para. 8, 33 I.L.M. at 1234.
126 The Understanding provides:
Panels shall be composed of well-qualified governmental and/or non-
governmental individuals, including persons who have served on or
presented a case to a panel, served as a representative of a Member or
of a contracting party to the GATT 1947 or as a representative to theCouncil or Committee of any covered agreement or its predecessor
agreement, or in the Secretariat, taught or published on international
trade law or policy, or served as a senior trade policy official of a
Member.
Id. art. 8, para. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 1231.
127 Pescatore confirms that as of 1995, the typical panel consists of members
of national delegations and outside members. See 1 HANDBOOK, supra note 19,
pt. 2, at 12.
12 See 1994 Understanding, supra note 10, art. 8, para. 9, 33 I.L.M. at 1232.
129 See id.
130 See id. art. 11, para. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 1233.
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is that it establishes an Appellate Body to review panel reports.
The Appellate Body is a standing group of seven persons who are
"of recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise in law,
international trade and the subject matter of the covered agree-
ments generally.""' The Understanding eschews designating this
body as a court, but its organization and functions have many of
the essential aspects of a judicial body.
With jurisdiction to entertain appeals from panel decisions on
"issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations
developed by the panel,""' the Appellate Body may uphold,
modify, or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of a
panel. 33 The Understanding contains a number of provisions
regarding the appointment of members to the Appellate Body and
their work in that body. The DSB has the power to appoint
members for four year terms and an individual may be reappoint-
ed once. 34 The Appellate Body does not sit en banc, but rather
each case is heard by three members. 3 5  Appellate Body pro-
ceedings are designated as confidential. 36 In its reports, the
views of individual members of the Appellate Body are not to be
attributed to their author; rather, opinions must be given anony-
131 Id. art. 17, para. 3, 33 I.L.M. at 1236. After extended conflict over the
eographical comosition of the group, the initial members of the Appellate
oy tave been dsignated. The seven individuals who were appointed are:
James Bacchus, a former U.S. Congressman and former Special
Assistant to the United States Trade Representative; Christopher
Beeby, a trade diplomat and former Ambassador from New Zealand;
Klaus-Dieter Ehlermann, a German trade lawyer and professor of
international economic law; Florentino Feliciano, a Filipino Supreme
Court Justice and former trade lawyer; Mitsuo Matsushita, a Japanese
professor of international economic law with ties to the Japanese
Ministry of Finance and Ministry of International Trade and Industry;
Julio Lacarte Muro, a Uruguayan trade diplomat and participant in all
eight GATT negotiation rounds; and Said el-Naggar, an Egyptian
professor of economics.
Biographical Notes on Members of World Trade Organization Appeals Body, [July-
Dec.] Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 230, at M-1 (Nov. 30, 1995).
132 1994 Understanding, supra note 10, art. 17, para. 6, 33 I.L.M. at 1236.
133 See id. art. 17, para. 13, 33 I.L.M. at 1237.
134 See id. art. 17, para. 2, 33. I.L.M. at 1236.
135 See id. art. 17, para. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 1236.
136 See id. art. 17, para. 10, 33 I.L.M. at 1236.
1996]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. j. Int'l Econ. L.
mously.137
Given the Appellate Body's qualifications and stability, its
decisions should substantially improve the quality of rulings in
individual cases. More fundamentally, however, the Appellate
Body should expound on the meaning of the agreements within
its jurisdiction and create a corpus of decisions that will assure
consistency in GATT law and, hopefully, elevate the professional
quality of the GATT dispute resolution mechanism. Growing
respect for and confidence in the rulings of this professional body,
even though not denominated a court, will advance international
trade further into a stable regime that is governed by law and legal
process.
As previously noted, the first decision of the Appellate Body
was reported on April 29, 1996.38 The case, which had been
instituted by Venezuela and Brazil against the United States,
resulted in a panel decision holding that U.S. implementation of
an environmental protection statute, the Clean Air Act, was
inconsistent with the General Agreement's "national treatment"
in Article III, paragraph 4, and further that the exemptions in
Article XX did not apply to the U.S. action. The Appellate Body
affirmed the panel decision, but under a different interpretation of
Article XX.1
39
3.1.3. The Dispute Settlement Body
GATT 1994 assigns the plenary function - previously
performed by the GATT Council or the CONTRACTING
PARTIES in proceedings under Article XXIII of GATT 1947 -
to a single Dispute Resolution Body ("DSB").' 4° The composi-
137 See id. art. 17, para. 11, 33 I.L.M. at 1236. The Understanding does not
specifically forbid the expression of dissenting or separate views by members
of the Appellate Body, but expression of such opinions would likely run afoul
of the requirement of anonymity.
138 See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
139 Acting U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky issued the
following statement after the Appellate Body's decision had been announced:
"While we are disappointed that the practical result of this case remains un-
changed, we are gratified that the Appellate Body has reversed am error that,
if fol owed by future panels, would have inappropriately limited this important
exemption [for measures relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources]." Office of the United States Trade Representative, Press Release 1
(April 29, 1996) (on file with author).
14 See 1994 Understanding, supra note 10, art. 2, para. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 1226.
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tion of the DSB mirrors the Council: any government that is a
Member of the World Trade Organization is entitled to a seat in
the DSB14 ' and each Member has one vote. A key position
within the DSB is the DSB chair 42 The DSB will have authori-
ty in four distinct spheres: "to establish panels, adopt panel and
Appellate Body reports, maintain surveillance of implementation
of rulings and recommendations, and authorize suspension of
concessions and other obligations under the covered agree-
ments." 43 Each of these functions represents a phase of the
dispute resolution process.
The WTO continues generally the practice of decision-making
by consensus followed under GATT 1947, but the idea of
consensus applies to the DSB in a vastly different manner. The
previous consensus rule permitted one nation, or a minority of
nations, to block conclusive action.1" Failure to adopt a report
often prevented the dispute resolution process from reaching
formal conclusion.
Hudec's account notes that the incidence of blocking Council
or Committee action increased considerably in the 1980s. 14' The
credibility of the GATT's system of dispute resolution was in
jeopardy so long as the losing party could prevent the plenary
body from taking action on the rulings and recommendations of
panels. Continuing controversy over the blocked reports was
inevitable. Moreover, consigning fully considered decisions to
legal limbo undermined the integrity of the entire system.
146
The Uruguay Round negotiators devised an ingenious solution
that eliminates the possibility of that one government could block
141 See id. With respect to the DSB function under one of the so-called
Plurilateral Agreements, only WTO Members which have joined in the
agreement in question participate in the DSB. See id.
142 The first chairman of the Dispute Settlement Body is Donald Kenyon
of Australia. See WTO Nominates Committee Heads at First Session of Council
Meeting, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 225 (Feb. 1, 1995).
143 See 1994 Understanding, supra note 10, art. 2, para. 1, 33 I.L.M. at
1226.
144 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
145 See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
146 In discussing the substantive corpus of GATT law, Hudec treats blocked
panel reports as equivalent to reports that had been adopted. See discussion
supra note 68 and accompanying text. Pescatore vehemently disagrees and
rejects unadopted reports, describing them as legal nullities. See 1 HANDBOOK,
supra note 19, pt. 2, at 10-11.
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action, while ostensibly adhering to the consensus principle.
Under GATT 1994, panels and the Appellate Body continue to
submit reports to the DSB, but the reports are "deemed" adopted
unless the DSB affirmatively refuses to adopt them. 147 The
consensus requirement was detached from motions to adopt
reports and attached instead to motions to reject reports. The
probability is exceedingly high that all reports submitted to the
DSB will be adopted. The reports of panels and of the Appellate
Body will be "final" as soon as the DSB meets to consider them.
The 1994 Understanding ensures this result:
Within [sixty] days after the date of circulation of a panel
report to the Members, the report shall be adopted at a
DSB meeting unless a party to the dispute formally notifies
the DSB of its decision to appeal or the DSB decides by
consensus not to adopt the report.
14 1
The Uruguay Round negotiators were not unaware of the
lawmaking potential of the GATT dispute resolution mechanism,
particularly the ability of the Appellate Body to shape and
develop GATT law through the power of precedent. The
negotiators not only stated their intention regarding the purposes
of the system, but also articulated limitations on the lawmaking
through dispute resolution. Two of the general provisions of the
1994 Understanding are pertinent:
The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central
element in providing security and predictability to the
14 See 1994 Understanding, supra note 10, art. 16, para. 4, 33 I.L.M. at
1235.
141 Id. (footnote omitted). The paragraph continues: "If a party has
notified its decision to appeal, the report by the panel shall not be considered
for adoption by the DSB until after completion of the appeal. This adoption
procedure is without prejudice to the right of Members to express their views
on a panel report." !-d.
Another significant clause in the provision for DSB adoption of Appellate
Body reports adds a term of unconditional acceptance of the report by the
parties to the controversy: "An Appellate Body report shall be adopted by the
DSB and unconditionally accepted7by the parties to the dispute unless the DSB
decides by consensus not to adopt the Appellate Body report within [thirty]
days following its circulation to the Members." Id. art. 17, para. 14, 33 I.L.M.
at 1237.
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multilateral trading system. The Members [of the WTO]
recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and obliga-
tions of Members under the covered agreements, and to
clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public
international law. Recommendations and rulings of the
DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations
provided in the covered agreements.149
All solutions to matters formally raised under the consulta-
tion and dispute settlement provisions of the covered
agreements, including arbitration awards, shall be consis-
tent with those agreements and shall not nullify or impair
benefits accruing to any Member under those agreements,
nor impede the attainment of any objective of those
agreements. 15°
Neither GATT 1947 nor the 1979 Understanding contained
comparable provisions as to purpose.51 It remains to be seen
how these provisions will affect decision making in future GATT
adjudication. Panels, the Appellate Body, and the DSB will give
meaning to these bipolar propositions as cases come before them.
Although the broad, affirmative, and purposeful declarations
should cause little concern, controversy is bound to arise over the
opposing concepts involved in interpreting textual provisions.
The distinction between clarification and enlargement of a
provision will inevitably be a source of disagreement. In submis-
sions to panels or the Appellate Body, advocates will seek to
buttress their arguments with minatory warnings that other
proposed readings would violate inherent constraints in the
interpretive process. The clause that forbids nullification or
impairment of benefits or impeding the attainment of any
149 Id. art. 3, para. 2, 33 I.L.M. at 1227.
150 Id. art. 3, para. 5, 33 I.L.M. at 1227.
151 The language derives from a 1989 decision of the CONTRACTING
PARTIES, midway through the Uruguay Round negotiations. See GENERAL
AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED
DOCUMENTS 36th Supp. 67 (1990).
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objective of those agreements is also likely to engender dis-
pute.
1 52
3.2. Changes to the Dispute Resolution System
When the DSB adopts a report, the dispute is still one
important step away from remedial action. GATT 1994 expands
on the nature of the remedies available to a complaining parties
and the means through which the GATT mechanism can
influence compliance.
3.2.1. Remedies
The 1994 Understanding addresses at some length the remedies
for violations of GATT agreements. Three possible remedies may
be invoked: compliance, compensation, or suspension of conces-
sions or obligations. 53  Compliance is the clearly preferred
remedy.15 4  The principal remedial objective is cessation of the
conduct that violates GATT obligations. In the parlance of
ordinary contract law, the remedy is akin to an injunction or
decree of specific performance. The Understanding makes this
clear with mandatory language:
Where a panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a
measure is inconsistent with a covered agreement, it shall
152 See GATT 1947, supra note 1, art. XXIII, para. 1, 61 Stat. at A64-65, 55
U.N.T.S. at 268.
153 See 1994 Understanding, supra note 10, art. 3, para. 7, 33 I.L.M. at 1227.
s See id. The Understanding declares this preference in several paragraphs.
For example:
In the absence of a mutually agreed solution, the first objective of the
dispute settlement mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal of
the measures concerned if these are found to be inconsistent with the
provisions of any of the covered agreements. The provision of
compensation should be resorted to only if the immediate withdrawal
of the measure is impracticable and as a temporary measure pending
the withdrawal of the measure which is inconsistent with a covered
agreement. The last resort which this Understandin& provides to the
Member invoking the dispute settlement procedures is the possibility
of suspending the application of concessions or other obligations under
the covered agreements on a discriminatory basis vis-a-vis the other
Member, subject to authorization by the of such measures.
Id.; see also id. art. 22, para. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 1239 (stating that compensation and
suspension are temporary measures of last resort).
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recommend that the Member concerned bring the measure
into conformity with that agreement. In addition to its
recommendations, the panel or Appellate Body may
suggest ways in which the Member concerned could
implement the recommendations.155
There are several obvious reasons for preferring the compli-
ance remedy. It restores the equilibrium of the international
economic order under the terms of the prior agreements of the
parties concerned. Once the offending measure has been terminat-
ed or corrected, a good relationship among the disputants should
also be restored. Other remedies may have secondary consequenc-
es that cannot be offset easily and that may linger well beyond the
appropriate time. One weakness in a pure compliance remedy,
however, is that the aggrieved party may have suffered injury
during the period of violation for which no restitution or damages
are imposed on the offending party. Unfortunately, a compliance-
centered remedial system does not deal effectively with such
matters.
Following action that a respondent contends is compliance,
controversy may arise over whether what the offending party has
done is sufficient to meet its obligations under GATT. If such
controversy continues, the DSB will refer the matter to the
original panel, which is expected to report its decision on the
question to the DSB within ninety days."5 6
The contracting parties recognized that however strong their
preference for the compliance remedy, cases of non compliance
are foreseeable and the 1994 Understanding must provide remedial
consequences for situations of non compliance. A second and
third tier remedies of compensation and suspension of concessions
or obligations are provided for this situation. The 1994 Under-
standing insists, however, that these are temporary measures
available only in cases where compliance with recommendations
I Id. art. 19, para. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 1237 (emphasis added, footnotes
omitted); see also id. art. 22, para. 1,. 33 I.L.M. at 1239 (discussing panel
recommendations of compensation and the suspension of concessions).
156 See id. art. 21, para. 5, 33 I.L.M. at 1238. If a panel cannot provide its
report within ninety days, it may inform the DSB of the reasons for delay and
estimate the date at which it will submit its report. See id.
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and rulings does not occur within a reasonable time.157
The 1994 Understanding says little about the nature or
measure of compensation beyond emphasizing that the GATT
system cannot impose this remedy on unwilling parties. The
violating nation may choose to offer compensation." 8 The
complaining party not need wait for an offer and may propose
terms of the compensation that it would accept. Although not
explicitly stated in the Understanding, it is probably true that a
complaining party is not required to accept any offer. Thus, the
compensation remedy is effectively voluntary on both sides.
Negotiations over compensation are likely to take place without
formal participation of the panel, the DSB, or any other GATT
entity, but the Director-General or others in the WTO
Secretariat's office may assist in certain individual controversies.
In the end, however, a compensation remedy is not available
without the agreement of the Member providing it and of the
Member receiving it.159
The Understanding does impose a limitation on the nature and
measure of compensation that the parties may negotiate. The
terms of the compensation agreement must be in "conformity
with the covered agreements."' ° Parties to a dispute cannot,
under the guise of an agreement on compensation, enter into
obligations that violate the GATT provisions. Thus, a compensa-
tion agreement could not institute a trading regime inconsistent
with the most-favored-nation undertaking of Article I.
The 1994 Understanding provides a brief period for negotia-
tion of a compensation remedy that is satisfactory to both
parties. 161 At the end of that time, the party entitled to a
157 See id. art. 22, para. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 1239
158 See id. art. 22, para. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 1239.
159 See id.
160 See id. art. 22, para. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 1239.
161 Although the timetable under the Agreement does not fix a time for
negotiations on compensation directly, it can be inferred from the period
allowed for compliance and the time when the prevailing party can invoke the
remedy of suspension of concessions or obligations. See id. art. 21, para. 3, 33
I.L.M. at 1238. The Agreement contemplates that a Member found to be in
violation, must inform the DSB within 30 days of its contemplated level of
compliance. If the Member declares its intentions to comply, it has a
"reasonable period of time" to effect compliance. The agreement actually
specifies how that period of time shall be determined. See id. If the Member
fails to comply, the Member must, if so requested, enter into negotiations with
the complaining party on possible acceptable compensation. See id. art. 22,
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remedy can proceed to the third tier remedy: suspension of
concessions or obligations. 162  Unlike the other remedies, this
remedy can be implemented by the prevailing party without the
cooperation or assent of the other party. In essence, the prevail-
ing party can suspend compliance with GATT obligations that it
owes to the violating party.1 63 Members cannot take such ac-
tions until they have exhausted the Understanding's procedures
that may culminate in DSB authorization to suspend concessions
or obligations."&I The Understanding limits the power of the
DSB to authorize a level of suspension that is "equivalent to the
level of the nullification or impairment." 16 Furthermore, the
DSB may not authorize suspension of concessions or obligations
if a covered agreement prohibits such suspension.
166
In seeking DSB authorization for the suspension remedy, the
para. 2, 33 I.L.M. 1239. Those negotiations must begin no later than the
expiration of the reasonable eriod of time fixed for compliance. Twenty days
after expiration of the time or compliance, the complaining party may invoke
the remedy of suspension of concessions or obligations. See id.
162 Although not explicitly provided for by the text of GATT 1994, these
types of remedies can be assumed valid since they are domestic actions which
are not violative of any GATT obligation. See id. art. 23, para. 2, 33 I.L.M. at
1241-42.
163 The best known example of this self-help remedy is found in U.S. law.
See 19 U.S.C. S 2411 (providing for mandatory or discretionary actions by the
President to suspend or withdraw the benefits of trade a reements with foreign
countries that violate any trade agreement provision). Reference to this
provision as "Section 301" derives from the internal numbering of the sections
of the Trade Act of 1974 in which it first appeared.
164 The Understanding provides: "When Members seek the redress of a
violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under
the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective
of the covere? agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules
and procedures of this Understanding." 1994 Understanding, supra note 10, art.
23, para. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 1241. The Understanding continues:
Members shall ... (c) follow the procedures set forth in Article 22 to
determine the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations
and obtain DSB authorization in accordance with those procedures
before suspending concessions or other obligations under the covered
agreements in response to the failure of the Member concerned to
implement the recommendations and rulings ....
Id. art. 23, para. 2, 33 I.L.M. at 1241-42.
165 Id. art. 22, para. 4, 33. I.L.M. at 1240.
16 See id. art. 22, para. 5, 33 I.L.M. at 1240.
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prevailing party proposes the sector of trade1 67 and the level of
suspension it seeks. After a complaining party submits a suspen-
sion proposal to the DSB, the DSB must meet expeditiously,
within approximately a month of the proposal. 168  The DSB
may take three possible actions: authorization to act as proposed,
refusal to authorize action for want of a consensus, 69 or referral
of the matter to "arbitration.""0
When the DSB considers authorizing a suspension of conces-
sions or obligations, the GATT 1947 consensus rule applies, not
the new GATT 1994 consensus rule that applies to adoption of re-
ports.17 ' If one Member present at the meeting of the DSB
formally objects to the DSB's granting authorization without
arbitration, a consensus would be lacking and the DSB could not
act beyond noting that it failed to reach a consensus. Since parties
to a dispute are not disqualified from participation in DSB
deliberations, the losing party can block the suspension proposed
by the prevailing party.
Of the possible courses of DSB action, resort to the arbitration
procedure is the course most likely to occur'1 2 Parties who
have lost in the merits phase of cases will face considerable
political pressure not to block DSB action on a motion to refer
the case to arbitration.73
If arbitration is ordered, the DSB refers the question of the
appropriate level of suspension back to the original panel if its
167 Trade "sectors" in GATT 1994 divide trade into three sectors: goods,
services, and trade related intellectual property rights. See id. art. 22, para. 3(,
33 I.L.M. at 1240.
16 See id. art. 22, para. 6, 33 I.L.M. at 1240.
169 The term "consensus" is defined: "The DSB shall be deemed to have
decided by consensus on a matter submitted for its consideration, if no
Member, present at the meeting of the DSB when the decision is taken,
formally objects to the proposed decision." Id. art 2, para. 4 n.1, 33 I.L.M. at
1227.
170 See id. art. 22, para. 6, 33 I.L.M. at 1240.
171 See discussion supra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
172 Immediate acceptance of a proposed suspension, at the level chosen by
the prevailing party, without the objective review of an arbitrator, is quiteunlik ely.
1 Article 23 of the 1994 Understanding obligates Members to "follow the
procedures set forth in Section 22 of the Understanding to determine the level
of suspension of concessions or other obligations and obtain DSB authorization
in accordance with these procedure" before taking unilateral action. 1994
Understanding, supra note 10, art. 22, para. 2, 33 I.L.M. at 1241-42.
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members are still available; 74 otherwise the DSB refers the
matter to an arbitrator or group of arbitrators appointed by the
Director-General." Thus, although styled as "arbitration," the
process may actually be a second phase of the panel proceeding
that led to the finding of a violation in the first instance. The
1994 Understanding allots sixty days as the maximum time for
completion of the determination. 176  The arbitrator is not
authorized to reconsider the merits of a case. Moreover, with
regard to the suspension remedy itself an arbitrator has only a
limited function: to "determine whether the level of such suspen-
sion is equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment."'77
Decision of an arbitrator is "final," in the sense that "the
parties concerned shall not seek a second arbitration.""8 Even
if the original panel serves as the arbitrator, a decision in this guise
cannot be appealed to the Appellate Body. Arbitrators' decisions
come back to the DSB, but, once again - as with consideration
of panel reports and of the Appellate Body - the consensus
requirement is inverted. In other words, if a complaining requests
that the DSB grant authorization to suspend concessions or other
obligations consistent with the decision of the arbitrator, the DSB
174 See id. art. 22, para 6, 33 I.L.M. at 1240.
17 See id. The Understanding does not specify what is meant by members
being "available." The situation of some, but not all members of the original
panel being available can be expected to arise. The Director-General might
appoint as arbitrator the member or members of the original panel who are
available, or replace a missing panel member, or designate a new person or
group. The Understanding appears to leave this in the discretion of the
Director-General.
176 See id. The Understanding obligates a prevailing party to propose
suspensions in the same sector as that in which the violation was found. Thus,
if the violation concerned goods, the retaliation remedy should, if practicable
and effective, apply to goods. Otherwise, the prevailing party may seek to
suspend concessions or obligations in other sectors under the same agreement.
If that is not practicable and effective, and if "the circumstances are serious
enough," the suspension may apply to concessions or obligations under another
covered agreement. Id. art. 22, para. 3(c), 33 I.L.M. at 1239.
1"7 Id. art. 22, para. 7, 33 I.L.M. at 1240. The 1994 agreement also declares
that the DSB may not authorize suspensions if the covered agreements prohibit
them. See id. art. 22, para. 5, 33 I.L.M. at 1240. Thus, "the arbitrator may also
determine if the proposed suspension ... is allowed under the covered agree-
ments." Id. art. 22, para. 7, 33 I.L.M. at 124041. If the proposed suspension
involves a different sector of trade from that involved in the underlying dispute,
the arbitrator may examine a claim that the prevailing party did not follow the
principles and procedures specified for a cross-sector remedy. Id.
178 Id.
1996]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
shall do so "unless the DSB decides by consensus to reject the
request."179
The controversy over oilseeds between the United States and
the European Community illustrates the significance of attaching
the consensus requirement to rejection, rather than authorization,
of a proposal to suspend concessions or obligations.80 Under
GATT 1947, two panels had ruled that the EC's oilseed subsidy
regimes nullified and impaired benefit accruing to the United
States under the EC's zero tariff bindings on oilseed imports."'
After the EC failed to terminate the subsidies, the United States
proposed and sought authorization for the suspension of conces-
sions on certain imports from the EC.1 12  The EC was able,
under the consensus rule of GATT 1947, to block affirmative
Council action." 3 Under GATT 1994, in a similar controversy,
after arbitration has confirmed the appropriate level of suspension,
the losing party could not use the consensus principle to prevent
the GATT plenary body from authorizing the implementation of
the proposed suspensions.
18 4
3.2.2. Compliance by Losing Parties: Surveillance
The GATT dispute resolution system, like any form of
adjudication in international law, becomes "soft" at the stage of
enforcing judgments. Hudec paid considerable attention to the
incidents of non compliance with panel rulings finding viola-
tions.8 5 He characterized these as cases with "negative out-
comes."18 6 Hudec found the rising rate of negative outcomes or
almost negative outcomes a matter of grave concern for the future
179 Id.
180 See HUDEC CASES, supra note 19 app. at 558-61 (discussing complaint
number 179).
181 See id. app. at 559.
182 See id.
183 See id. app. at 560. Council action would have been to approve or
disapprove the proposed action of the United States without the aid of an
arbitrator s report. The arbitration mechanism introduced by GATT 1994 was
not available in the oilseeds subsidy case.
184 See 1994 Understanding, art. 25, para. 2, 33 T.L.M. at 1242 (providing
for arbitration without resort to a consensus rule).
181 See HUDEC CASES, supra note 19, at 200.
186 See id. at 200, 276 (explaining that a "negative outcome describes cases
in which the GATT system -as failed to enforce a valid claim").
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of the GATT system.1 7 GATT 1994, as just discussed, provides
that compliance with rulings and recommendations is the
preferred remedy and, indeed, the only remedy not deemed
temporary.88 The prospect of non compliance was a serious
issue addressed by the Uruguay Round negotiators attempting to
ameliorate the non compliance problem. The effects of these
changes are uncertain.
One dimension of the problem, which has its roots in the text
of GATT Article XXIII, is manner by which Article XXIII blurs
provisions for conciliation of disputes with provisions for
adjudication of disputes. It took some time for the GATT system
to evolve a mechanism that issued definitive rulings about which
of the contesting parties should prevail. 89 Reports of GATT
panels, the heart of the books of Hudec and Pescatore, are rulings
that are intended to be obeyed, not suggestions for settlements
that each party is free to accept or not. But the idea of concilia-
tion has remained part of, and perhaps central to, the ideal of
dispute resolution under GATT. Many disputes that arose were
settled, sometimes before the filing of a complaint and sometimes
after the adjudicatory process had started. Of the 207 disputes on
Hudec's master list, 88 went to decision.1'9
Adjudication and conciliation, while recognized means for
dispute resolution, are vastly different in their dynamics.
Conciliation, in the end, requires that the parties be reconciled,
that they arrive at satisfactory solution; conciliation depends upon
voluntary agreement. Adjudication, on the other hand, is a
method of resolving controversies that cannot be settled amicably
by agreement. Disputes are submitted to a tribunal which, after
hearing the contestants, issues rulings. Blurring the distinction
between conciliation and adjudication is especially harmful if the
losing party in adjudication can treat dispositive rulings as akin to
proposals for conciliation.
GATT 1994, like GATT 1947, combines conciliation with
adjudication in the Understanding but tends to a greater extent
than before to differentiate the two. Even so, the conflation of
conciliation with adjudication remains. The following provisions
187 See id. at 305-07 (providing relevant statistics).
18 See discussion supra section 3.2.
189 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
190 See HUDEC CASFS, supra note 19 app. at 277.
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illustrate the blending of the separate processes:
Recommendations or rulings made by the Dispute Settle-
ment Body shall be aimed at achieving a satisfactory
settlement of the matter in accordance with the rights and
obligations under this Understanding and under the
covered agreements. 19'
The aim of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure
a positive solution to a dispute. A solution mutually
acceptable to the parties to a dispute and consistent with
the covered agreements is clearly to be preferred. In the
absence of a mutually agreed solution, the first objective of
the dispute settlement mechanism is usually to secure the
withdrawal of the measures concerned if these are found to
be inconsistent with the provisions of any of the covered
agreements. 92
The subject of the first quoted provision, "recommendations or
rulings," is drawn directly from the awkward phrasing of GATT
Article XXIII.'9 This phrase seems paradoxical. In the normal
meaning of words, recommendations can be accepted or rejected
as the parties see fit while rulings are meant to be definitive.
Either conciliation or adjudication can lead to a "satisfactory
settlement" if that phrase is construed broadly. Reference to
"rights and obligations" is more aligned with rulings than to
recommendations. In the second quoted provision, the meaning
of "positive solution" is not obvious. The remainder of that
paragraph, divided by "in the absence of a mutually agreed
solution," deals on one side with conciliation and on the other
with adjudication. In succeeding parts of the Understanding, the
processes of conciliation and adjudication are addressed separate-
ly.1
94
191 1994 Understanding, supra note 10, art. 3, para. 4, 33 I.L.M. at 1227.
192 id. art. 3, para. 7, 33 I.L.M. at 1227. The paragraph further provides for
the alternative remedies of compensation or suspension of concessions or
obligations. See id.
193 See GATT 1947, supra note 1, art. XXIII, 61 Stat. at A64-65, 55
U.N.T.S. at 267-68.
19' See 1994 Understanding, supra note 10, arts. 5, 25.
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Since the general drafting strategy of GATT 1994 was to
preserve GATT 1947 and expand upon it, there was no easy
escape from the inherent ambiguities in paragraph 2 of Article
XXIII. If negotiators had drawn a sharper line between the two
processes, it might have been beneficial in reducing the incidence
of negative outcomes in adjudicated cases, but such was not the
case.
GATT 1994 does have a number of exhortations and declara-
tions intended to give weight to DSB decisions adopting reports
of panels or of the Appellate Body. Thus, the Understanding
declares: "Prompt compliance with recommendations or rulings
of the DSB is essential to ensure effective resolution of disputes to
the benefit of all Members[,]" 1" and as previously noted: "An
Appellate Body report shall be ... unconditionally accepted by
the parties to the dispute unless the DSB decides by consensus not
to adopt the Appellate Body report ... "196
In addition to these assertions, the Uruguay Round negotiators
added procedural steps to the DSB function clearly designed to
exert pressure on nations ruled in violation of a GATT agree-
ment. Shortly after the DSB adopts reports of panels or the
Appellate Body for the first time, "the Member concerned shall
inform the DSB of its intentions in respect of implementation of
the recommendation and rulings of the DSB." 97 Nations are
called upon to declare, forthrightly and formally, whether they
will comply or not. Thereafter, and for the indefinite future, the
matter of compliance remains a potential issue for the DSB's
agenda, a ongoing process that is called "surveillance":
The DSB shall keep under surveillance the implementation
of adopted recommendations or rulings. The issue of
implementation of the recommendations may be raised at
the DSB by any Member at any time following their
adoption. Unless the DSB decides otherwise, the issue of
implementation of the recommendations or rulings ...
shall remain on the DSB's agenda until the issue is re-
solved. At least [ten] days prior to each such meeting, the
195 Id. art. 21, para. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 1238.
196 Id. art. 17, para. 14, 33 I.L.M. at 1237.
197 Id. art. 21, para. 3, 33 I.L.M. at 1238.
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Member concerned shall provide the DSB with a status
report in writing of its progress in the implementation of
the recommendations or rulings.19
The level of compliance with decisions in contested cases
remains to be seen. Some improvement over the previous system
may reasonably be anticipated. Whether GATT 1994 will be
effective in this regard will turn, in some measure, on the
perceived quality and persuasive force of the reasoning in the
reports of panels and the Appellate Body.
4. BEYOND 1994: "GATT FUTURE"
The institutional structure of the World Trade Organization
is now in place. Whether - and how well - that structure will
serve the international economy is very uncertain. The focus of
this Article has been on the dispute resolution system inherited by
the WTO and extensively developed by the Uruguay Round
Agreement. The success or failure of the dispute settlement
system will determine the extent to which the global economy
will develop under a regime of law. That success or failure is
contingent, in large measure, upon the quality of the decisions
made. The legal community has a unique opportunity and
responsibility to contribute to whatever the outcome will be.
GATT case law matters. Every decision matters, of course, to
the parties to the dispute. The formal parties are the governments
of WTO Members. The issues to be resolved are the legality,
under GATT, of trade measures taken by governments. The
future of national sovereignty is directly at stake. Members of the
WTO, mostly national governments, have committed themselves
to the substantive norms of GATT 1994 and to an institution one
of whose functions is to render judgments on the lawfulness of
national laws and practices. Commitments of this kind are
without precedent in international law.199 What remains to be
198 Id. art. 21, para. 6, 33 I.L.M. at 1239.
199 The United Nations, even at the level of its most potent branch, the
Security Council, does not have the power to develop a system of law
comparable to that which may emerge from the World Trade Organization.
The commitments of the nations of the European Union ("EU") to bind
themselves to that institution do exceed the commitments of the international
community to the World Trade Organization, but the scale of the EU does not
compare with that of the global community of nations which created the
[Vol. 17:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol17/iss2/5
GA 27 ENFORCEMENT
seen is whether those commitments to norms and structure will
hold when international norms, as construed by the Dispute
Settlement Body, impinge upon sensitive national choices and
national policies.
The WTO, as a governmental institution, lacks significant
strength in legislative and executive functions. The Director-
General and the Secretariat cannot be expected to take strong
initiatives in shaping the law. Further legislative elaboration of
the norms of WTO law remains a process of nations negotiating
and bargaining.2°° The judicial function has been much further
developed. It alone is capable of acting without the consent of all
affected national governments. The work of that branch, and its
reception, matters greatly therefore to the future of international
economic law.
Chauvinistic believers in unfettered national sovereignty see
the WTO dispute resolution system as a major threat. Views of
that kind will be found in all parts of the world, from the most
developed to the least developed nations. Their cries of alarm will
sound particularly in democracies at election times. There is, of
course, another, and better, view. It is in each nation's deepest
sovereign interest to be part of a legal order that stimulates and
regulates growth of the global economy. National interests will
be advanced both economically and politically by an effective
international legal order.201
GATT case law matters in whether the commitment of 100-
plus nations to create a dispute resolution system that can act
without their consent ultimately succeeds. Critical will be the
quality of the decisions rendered - and the perception of that
quality among interested parties - in the formative years.
WTO.
200 This is illustrated in the efforts to negotiate trade rules in the services
sector. In April 1996, the Members of the WTO failed to meet the deadline
for negotiating a global telecommunications regime. Negotiations in regard to
financial services and maritime shipping are also proceeding badly. The "legisla-
tion" of new legal standards in these and other sectors of trade requires the
acquiescence of national governments. The process resemble contract
bargaining more than legislation.
201 Enlightened national government leaders see the explosive growth of
multinational enterprises (MNFs") as an important reason for the establish-
ment of a regime of international economic law. As MNEs grow in size and
economic power, they have the capacity to take actions that are effectively
beyond the control of any national government.
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There are profound implications for lawyers, for those who
work within the WTO's dispute settlement system and for those
who counsel and represent national governments, as well as for
lawyers in the larger legal communities. The initial appointees to
the WTO Appellate Body have an especially heavy responsibility
to give that important body and its decisions stature and credibili-
ty; their judgments will become the paramount precedents of the
new system. National government counsel, whose advocacy will
influence the Appellate Body, should craft submissions to the
Appellate Body, and to panels, with a strong sense of institution
building as well as arguments directed to the immediate case.
But there are also implications for lawyers not directly
involved within the WTO or in disputes being litigated. Any
legal system depends upon an informed legal community.
Objective outsiders must be enlisted to give serious and sustained
attention to the work of the WTO as it evolves. Scholars and law
students must be enlisted to study and critique this body of law.
Their analysis and commentary can become a vital contribution
to the quality of the law. Writings of Hudec, Pescatore,
Petersmann, Jaenicke, and others, lay an important foundation.
Hopefully, they will continue to contribute, but others must join
in the effort. Law students, writing for journals like this one,
could institute a practice of case-note commentaries on decisions
of the Appellate Body and panels.
The daunting task for both participants and scholars is the
establishment of a new jurisprudence. The field requires standards
of excellence against which particular decisions can be measured.
Undoubtedly, scholars will search for analogous fields of law from
which to extrapolate standards for the WTO system of dispute
resolution, but the WTO system is already well beyond any other
body of international law. Standards drawn from one or another
national legal system or even from one of the broad legal
traditions - civil or common-law - are probably inapt for this
purpose.202
202 An important question for the interpretive function is the appropriate
weight, if any, of what may be called the legislative history of the adopted
texts. Pescatore offers an interesting and, no doubt, debatable, point of view
regarding recourse to the drafting history of the General Agreement:
At first sight, this method might seem to provide convincing
arguments by referring governments to their own intentions. In fact,
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The primary sources of law to be applied in disputes are the
extensive written texts. Like any written text, these are imperfect
and incomplete. They are the compromise formulations that
survived long and often difficult multilateral negotiations. Some
provisions were carefully, painfully crafted during years of
successive bargaining sessions; others were last-minute insertions
by weary negotiators racing against deadlines. What standards of
interpretation are to be applied to future application of these texts
in resolution of disputes?23 The term of the WTO Agreement
permitting "clarifications" but not "expansions" must, itself, be
construed.
GATT 1994 is, in many respects, an overlay superimposed on
GATT 1947. That, alone, poses a major set of interpretive
problems. How much weight should attach to the old and new
texts? To what extent is the corpus of GATT law found in panel
decisions under GATT 1947 of continuing relevance?2°4 To
however, the excessive use of these materials is out of place and even
counterproductive for several reasons. First, it prompts the panels to shift
their attention from the analysis of substantive problems and from the
consideration of GATT's objectives to textual research of a purely semantic
character. Second, arguments based on textual history tend to foster a
retrospective interpretation of an Agreement which ... was meant to be
a forward-looking instrument aimed-at creating a basis for the solution of
trade problems of the future, not at perpetuating past ideas about
international trade. Third, attention must be drawn to the fact that only
a small number of GATT's membership were involved in drafting [the
text]. The newer members of GATT have accepted the General Agree-
ment at face-value but they cannot be engaged a posteriori in the
meanderings of preparatory work in which they had no part.
See 1 HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 23-24.
203 Article XX of the General Agreement has been especially difficult to
apply because its terms require considerable interpretation. The subparagraphs
of Article XX, which exempt national trade measures that would otherwise be
illegal under other articles of the General Agreement, were the source of
disputed interpretations before 1994. Interpretation of subparagraph (g), the
provision exempting measures relating to the conservation of exhaustible
natural resources," was the central issue in the first decision of the WTO
Appellate Body. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text. The Appellate
Body modifiedthe panel report's construction of subparagraph (g). Although
the modification did not change the outcome of the case, the Acting United
States Trade Representative expressed satisfaction with the Appellate Body's
interpretation of this key GATT provision that may shelter environmental
protection laws and regulations from other GATT restrictions. See discussion
supra note 139.
204 The WTO Members explicitly affirmed "adherence to the principles for
the management of disputes heretofore applied," 1994 Understanding, supra
19961
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what extent, if any, are the texts and the interpretations of the
Tokyo Round codes of continuing relevance? Only a minority of
GATT nations had become signatories of those codes, which are
nonetheless precursors of parts of GATT 1994.
As time passes, decisions rendered under the Understanding
will accumulate. To what extent should the principle of stare
decisis apply to panel decisions? Under GATT 1947 and the
GATT codes, panels referred extensively to reports of prior
panels, but Pescatore noted that "references to precedents.., tend
to be extremely short and cryptic, the sole reference often being
the page number where the quoted phrase or words are to be
found."25 The common-law tradition gives greater weight to
precedent than does civil law. Standards for the appropriate
deference to prior panel rulings must be developed.
The decisions of the Appellate Body are of a different order
than panel decisions. Panels will certainly defer to the prior
rulings of the Appellate Body, but the nature and extent of
deference to higher authority within a hierarchical system is never
a simple question. That will be especially true in the early period
of Appellate Body work as that Body develops its own principles
for deference to past decisions of the Body. Normally, only three
of the seven members of the Body will sit in a case; stability and
coherence of the corpus of law developed by the Body depends
greatly on how the views of the entire Body will be ascertained
and expressed in the case law.
One final point about dispute resolution under GATT 1994:
the system has lacked and continues to lack a satisfactory method
for resolving issues of fact that arise in disputes before panels.
Some controversies are framed in terms of the facial validity of
trade measures in dispute, but inevitably controversies take the
form of considering the effects of trade measures in dispute, and
sometimes take the form of considering the purposes of the
measures. Questions of effect and purpose are issues of fact, for
which rules of evidence, burden of proof, and so forth must be
created. Panels and the Appellate Body will be forced to develop
methods for dealing with disputes that turn on questions of fact.
note 10, art. 3, para. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 1227, but also declared that the Under-
standing did not apply to ongoing disputes. Id. art. 3, para. 11, 33 I.L.M. at
1228.
205 1 HANDBOOK, supra note 19, pt. 1, 23.
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They will be aided to some extent by the power, under GATT
1994, to refer some issues to groups of experts, or in the case of
remedies, to an arbitrator. However, that will be only a partial
solution to the broader problem and, even where referrals are
made, the Appellate Body and panels will face questions concern-
ing how the experts or arbitrator determined the facts in contro-
versy.
5. CONCLUSION
International economic law as set forth in GATT 1994 is
about to be given form under the new dispute resolution system.
The uncertain outcome of that development is a challenge to
everyone interested in the shape of the international economy.
Responses to this challenge by lawyers, law teachers and scholars,
and law students will be the most important force giving shape
and meaning to this new field of law.
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